Tabberone is pronounced tab ber won
not tay ber own
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Tabberone is pronounced tab ber won |
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| This information is taken directly from the court opinion. It is not taken out of context nor is it altered. |
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From Country Kids v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir 1996)
The district court ruled that although the dolls' specific features were protected, Plaintiff's copyright did not extend to the size, shape and medium of the dolls. This ruling stemmed from the court's application of the Copyright Act, which provides in relevant part that: |
| [i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. [note: emphasis in original] |
| 17 U.S.C. ยง 102(b). This provision differentiates between expression and ideas--withholding protection for ideas so that they can remain in the public domain and provide a general benefit to society. See, e.g., Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1491 ("One of the fundamentals of copyright law is that a copyright does not protect an idea, but only the expression of the idea."). However, this limit on copyright protection, although sound in theory, is often difficult to apply in practice. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The critical distinction between `idea' and `expression' is difficult to draw."). Because the idea/expression distinction is somewhat elusive, courts often adopt an ad hoc approach, eschewing the application of any bright line rule or any clear formula. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the `idea,' and has borrowed its `expression'" so such decisions must "inevitably be ad hoc"); see also Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int'l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting the absence of any statutory or judicially created criteria for this determination), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989). However, in differentiating between an idea and a specific form of expression, it is important to remember that copyright law seeks to achieve a proper balance between competition based on public ideas and incentive to produce original work. Hence, to the extent that the idea and the particular expression cannot be separated, the work cannot be protected by a copyright because "protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner." Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742; see also Atari, 672 F.2d at 616. Indeed, "where the protected work and the accused work express the same idea, the similarity that inevitably stems solely from the commonality of the subject matter is not proof of unlawful copying." Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980). Thus, "[s]imilarity as to standard doll features is not as indicative of copying as would be similarity of features that render the protected toy distinctive." Id. at 916-17. |
