Tabberone is pronounced tab ber won
not tay ber own
|
|
Tabberone is pronounced tab ber won |
|
| This information is taken directly from the court opinion. It is not taken out of context nor is it altered. |
|
From John Paul Mitchell v Pete N Larry's, 862 F.Supp. 1020 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)
The fourth claim asserts -- again after incorporating all that came before it -- that "[d]efendants' purchase/sale of Paul Mitchell Products constitute intentional, tortious interference with the contracts between JPMS and its authorized distributors and/or between authorized distributors of Paul Mitchell Products and the hair salons to which those authorized distributors sell Paul Mitchell Products." In order to succeed on a claim for tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a valid contract between it and a third party, the defendant's knowledge of such contract, the defendant's intentional procuring of the breach thereof by the third party and resultant damages. See Israel v. Wood Dolson Company, 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956). "[T]he interference must be intentional, not merely negligent or incidental to some other, lawful, purpose." Alvord & Swift v. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 281, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309, 385 N.E.2d 1238 (1978). The defendants claim that "because [they] have had no contacts or dealings with authorized JPMS distributors or hair salons, there can be no dispute that they did not `procure' any breach of the JPMS/distributor contracts or the distributor/hair salon contracts." The defendants have also submitted supporting affidavits to this effect, stating that they never had any contact with either authorized JPMS distributors or authorized JPMS hair salons and that their product had come from unauthorized sellers. See Affidavit of Marcia McHenry (sworn to June 17, 1993); Affidavit of Michael Quinn (sworn to June 15, 1993); Affidavit of Steven Drahos (sworn to June 14, 1993); Affidavit of Jerome Biarsky (sworn to June 16, 1993); Affidavit of Elenterio A. Boni (sworn to July 8, 1993). In response, the plaintiffs argue that, "by virtue of defendants' knowledge of the nature of the distribution network for Paul Mitchell Products, defendants intentionally procured, directly or indirectly, the breach of various of these contracts by causing their as yet largely unidentified sellers either to breach their contractual obligations or to include others in the chain of title, who also remain unidentified, to breach their contractual obligations." As the defendants point out, the plaintiffs' contention, when stripped of its conjectural allegations based on unsupported or unalleged facts, is that the defendants should be held liable for tortious inducement because they purchased Paul Mitchell Products while knowing that such products would not have been obtainable unless, presumably, someone along the JPMS's distribution network had breached his, her or its contract with JPMS. While the fact that the defendants are at least two steps removed from the contractual relationship does not necessarily relieve them of liability -- see Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Corp., 2 A.D.2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1st Dept.1956) ("The circuity of defendant's actions will not relieve it of responsibility for its tortious misconduct"); but see Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, Etc., 204 F.2d 495, 498 (3rd Cir.1953) ("neither in contract nor in tort have duties been extended very far beyond the immediate parties to the facts out of which a cause of action is said to arise")â€", the plaintiffs' claim fails to show "inducement" of the alleged breach. Cf., Restatement of Torts (2d) § 766, comment n (mere making of agreement by a third party with knowledge of the inevitable breach of contract by the other party does not constitute actionable inducement). The fourth claim will be dismissed. |
