Mattel, Inc.
v.
MCA Records, Inc.
296 F.3d 894
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit
July 24, 2002
OPINION
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:
If this were a sci-fi melodrama, it might be called
Speech-Zilla meets Trademark Kong.
I
Barbie was born in Germany in the 1950s as an adult
collector's item. Over the years, Mattel transformed her from a doll that
resembled a "German street walker,"1 as she
originally appeared, into a glamorous, long-legged blonde. Barbie has been
labeled both the ideal American woman and a bimbo. She has survived attacks both
psychic (from feminists critical of her fictitious figure) and physical (more
than 500 professional makeovers). She remains a symbol of American girlhood, a
public figure who graces the aisles of toy stores throughout the country and
beyond. With Barbie, Mattel created not just a toy but a cultural icon.
With fame often comes unwanted attention. Aqua is a Danish band that has, as
yet, only dreamed of attaining Barbie-like status. In 1997, Aqua produced the
song Barbie Girl on the album Aquarium. In the song, one bandmember impersonates
Barbie, singing in a high-pitched, doll-like voice; another bandmember, calling
himself Ken, entices Barbie to "go party." (The lyrics are in the Appendix.)
Barbie Girl singles sold well and, to Mattel's dismay, the song made it onto Top
40 music charts.
Mattel brought this lawsuit against the music companies who produced, marketed
and sold Barbie Girl . . . (collectively, "MCA"). . . . MCA in turn challenged
the district court's jurisdiction under the Lanham Act and its personal
jurisdiction over the foreign defendants . . .; MCA also brought a defamation
claim against Mattel for statements Mattel made about MCA while this lawsuit was
pending. The district court concluded it had jurisdiction over the foreign
defendants and under the Lanham Act, and granted MCA's motion for summary
judgment on Mattel's federal and state-law claims for trademark infringement and
dilution. The district court also granted Mattel's motion for summary judgment
on MCA's defamation claim.
Mattel appeals the district court's ruling that Barbie Girl is a parody of
Barbie and a nominative fair use . . . . . . .
. . .
III
A. A trademark is a word, phrase or symbol
that is used to identify a manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of
a service. . . . It's the owner's way of preventing others from
duping consumers into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by
the trademark owner. . . .
The problem arises when trademarks transcend their identifying purpose. Some
trademarks enter our public discourse and become an integral part of our
vocabulary. How else do you say that something's "the Rolls Royce of its class"?
What else is a quick fix, but a Band-Aid? Does the average consumer know to ask
for aspirin as "acetyl salicylic acid"? . . . Trademarks often fill
in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to our expressions. Once
imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word in our language
and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.
Our likelihood-of-confusion test . . . generally strikes a comfortable balance
between the trademark owner's property rights and the public's expressive
interests. But when a trademark owner asserts a right to control how we express
ourselves--when we'd find it difficult to describe the product any other way (as
in the case of aspirin), or when the mark (like Rolls Royce) has taken on an
expressive meaning apart from its source-identifying function-- applying the
traditional test fails to account for the full weight of the public's interest
in free expression.
The First Amendment may offer little protection for a competitor who labels its
commercial good with a confusingly similar mark, but "[t]rademark rights do not
entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is
communicating ideas or expressing points of view." L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir.1987). Were we to ignore the
expressive value that some marks assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach
upon the zone protected by the First Amendment. . . . Simply put,
the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse whenever
the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying
function. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296,
301 (9th Cir.1979) ("It is the source-denoting function which trademark laws
protect, and nothing more.").
B. There is no doubt that MCA uses Mattel's mark: Barbie is one half of Barbie
Girl. But Barbie Girl is the title of a song about Barbie and Ken, a reference
that--at least today--can only be to Mattel's famous couple. We expect a title
to describe the underlying work, not to identify the producer, and Barbie Girl
does just that.
The Barbie Girl title presages a song about Barbie, or at least a girl like
Barbie. The title conveys a message to consumers about what they can expect to
discover in the song itself; it's a quick glimpse of Aqua's take on their own
song. The lyrics confirm this: The female singer, who calls herself Barbie, is
"a Barbie girl, in [her] Barbie world." She tells her male counterpart (named
Ken), "Life in plastic, it's fantastic. You can brush my hair, undress me
everywhere/Imagination, life is your creation." And off they go to "party." The
song pokes fun at Barbie and the values that Aqua contends she represents. See
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490,
495-96 (2d Cir.1989). The female singer explains, "I'm a blond bimbo girl, in a
fantasy world/Dress me up, make it tight, I'm your dolly."
The song does not rely on the Barbie mark to poke fun at another subject but
targets Barbie herself. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 580 (1994); see also Dr. Seuss Ents., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,
109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.1997). This case is therefore distinguishable from
Dr. Seuss, where we held that the book The Cat NOT in the Hat! borrowed Dr.
Seuss's trademarks and lyrics to get attention rather than to mock The Cat in
the Hat! The defendant's use of the Dr. Seuss trademarks and copyrighted works
had "no critical bearing on the substance or style of" The Cat in the Hat!, and
therefore could not claim First Amendment protection. Id. at 1401. Dr. Seuss
recognized that, where an artistic work targets the original and does not merely
borrow another's property to get attention, First Amendment interests weigh more
heavily in the balance. See id. at 1400-02; see also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.
Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812-13 (2d Cir.1999) (a parodist whose expressive
work aims its parodic commentary at a trademark is given considerable leeway,
but a claimed parodic use that makes no comment on the mark is not a permitted
trademark parody use).
The Second Circuit has held that "in general the [Lanham] Act should be
construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression." Rogers
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir.1989); see also Cliffs Notes,
886 F.2d at 494 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999). Rogers considered a
challenge by the actress Ginger Rogers to the film Ginger and Fred. The movie
told the story of two Italian cabaret performers who made a living by imitating
Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. Rogers argued that the film's title created the
false impression that she was associated with it.
At first glance, Rogers certainly had a point. Ginger was her name, and Fred was
her dancing partner. If a pair of dancing shoes had been labeled Ginger and
Fred, a dancer might have suspected that Rogers was associated with the shoes
(or at least one of them), just as Michael Jordan has endorsed Nike sneakers
that claim to make you fly through the air. But Ginger and Fred was not a brand
of shoe; it was the title of a movie and, for the reasons explained by the
Second Circuit, deserved to be treated differently.
A title is designed to catch the eye and to promote the value of the underlying
work. Consumers expect a title to communicate a message about the book or movie,
but they do not expect it to identify the publisher or producer. . . .
If we see a painting titled "Campbell's Chicken Noodle Soup," we're unlikely to
believe that Campbell's has branched into the art business. Nor, upon hearing
Janis Joplin croon "Oh Lord, won't you buy me a Mercedes-Benz?," would we
suspect that she and the carmaker had entered into a joint venture. A title
tells us something about the underlying work but seldom speaks to its origin:
Though consumers frequently look to the
title of a work to determine what it is about, they do not regard titles of
artistic works in the same way as the names of ordinary commercial products.
Since consumers expect an ordinary product to be what the name says it is, we
apply the Lanham Act with some rigor to prohibit names that misdescribe such
goods. But most consumers are well aware that they cannot judge a book solely
by its title any more than by its cover.
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000 (citations
omitted).
Rogers concluded that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act
"unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever,
or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as
to the source or the content of the work." Id. at 999 (footnote omitted). We
agree with the Second Circuit's analysis and adopt the Rogers standard as
our own.
Applying Rogers to our case, we conclude that MCA's use of Barbie is not
an infringement of Mattel's trademark. Under the first prong of Rogers,
the use of Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work,
namely, the song itself. As noted, the song is about Barbie and the values Aqua
claims she represents. The song title does not explicitly mislead as to the
source of the work; it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was
produced by Mattel. The only indication that Mattel might be associated with the
song is the use of Barbie in the title; if this were enough to satisfy this
prong of the Rogers test, it would render Rogers a nullity. We
therefore agree with the district court that MCA was entitled to summary
judgment on this ground. We need not consider whether the district court was
correct in holding that MCA was also entitled to summary judgment because its
use of Barbie was a nominative fair use.2
. . .
VI
After Mattel filed suit, Mattel and MCA
employees traded barbs in the press. When an MCA spokeswoman noted that each
album included a disclaimer saying that Barbie Girl was a "social commentary
[that was] not created or approved by the makers of the doll," a Mattel
representative responded by saying, "That's unacceptable. . . . It's akin to a
bank robber handing a note of apology to a teller during a heist. [It n]either
diminishes the severity of the crime, nor does it make it legal." He later
characterized the song as a "theft" of "another company's property."
MCA filed a counterclaim for defamation based on the Mattel representative's use
of the words "bank robber," "heist," "crime" and "theft." But all of these are
variants of the invective most often hurled at accused infringers, namely
"piracy." No one hearing this accusation understands intellectual property
owners to be saying that infringers are nautical cutthroats with eyepatches and
peg legs who board galleons to plunder cargo. In context, all these terms are
nonactionable "rhetorical hyperbole," Gilbrook v. City of Westminster,
177 F.3d 839, 863 (9th Cir.1999). The parties are advised to chill.
AFFIRMED.
APPENDIX
"Barbie Girl" by Aqua
-Hiya Barbie!
-Hi Ken!
You wanna go for a ride?
-Sure, Ken!
-Jump in!
-Ha ha ha ha!
(CHORUS:)
I'm a Barbie girl, in my Barbie world
Life in plastic, it's fantastic
You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere
Imagination, life is your creation
Come on Barbie, let's go party!
(CHORUS)
I'm a blonde bimbo girl, in a fantasy world
Dress me up, make it tight, I'm your dolly
You're my doll, rock and roll, feel the glamour in pink
Kiss me here, touch me there, hanky-panky
You can touch, you can play
If you say "I'm always yours," ooh ooh
(CHORUS)
(BRIDGE:)
Come on, Barbie, let's go party, ah ah ah yeah
Come on, Barbie, let's go party, ooh ooh, ooh ooh
Come on, Barbie, let's go party, ah ah ah yeah
Come on, Barbie, let's go party, ooh ooh, ooh ooh
Make me walk, make me talk, do whatever you please
I can act like a star, I can beg on my knees
Come jump in, be my friend, let us do it again
Hit the town, fool around, let's go party
You can touch, you can play
You can say "I'm always yours"
You can touch, you can play
You can say "I'm always yours"
(BRIDGE)
(CHORUS x2)
(BRIDGE)
-Oh, I'm having so much fun!
-Well, Barbie, we're just getting started!
-Oh, I love you Ken!
1 M.G. Lord, Forever Barbie: The Unauthorized
Biography of a Real Doll 32 (1994).
2 The likelihood-of-confusion test also governs
Mattel's state law claims of unfair competition. Cleary v. News Corporation,
30 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Academy of Motion Picture Arts &
Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th
Cir.1991)). Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on
these claims as well.
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