Plaintiffs Karen Dudnikov, and Michael Meadors, pro se, complains of Defendant Shabby Chic, Incorporated
("Shabby Chic"), and allege as follows:
I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is an action for Declaratory Judgment under
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The claims for relief are covered by the Lanham Act
15 U.S.C., and through the Copyright Act 17, U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Additionally, this court has
jurisdiction under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. §512 (g) (3) (D)
wherein jurisdiction is established in this court as part of the counter notification procedure. Venue
is also proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) in that a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to this law suit, as well as injury to the plaintiffs, have occurred
or will occur in this district, as a result of the unlawful acts of the defendant as outlined below.
2. Plaintiffs Karen Dudnikov, a/k/a TABBERONE, and husband Michael Meadors, are Colorado residents who run
a unincorporated home-based business that primarily does business on the eBay internet auction site as well
as through a web site, www.tabberone.com.
3. Using the eBay seller name of Tabberone, the plaintiffs manufacture fabric items from lawfully
acquired copyrighted fabrics and then sell these fabric items on the web site as well as through eBay.
The Plaintiffs also buy and resell a variety of collectibles and other items in the same manner.
4. Upon information and belief, defendant Shabby
Chic, Inc., is a California corporation with it's headquarters located 6330 Arizona Circle Los Angeles, 90045.
5. Upon information and belief, Shabby Chic has actively engaged in threatening and intimidating persons
who have attempted to sell items on eBay when the listings included the words "Shabby Chic", individually and
as a phrase, in the item title or item description. These actions include threats of litigation through cease
and desist letters as well as terminating eBay auctions using the above mentioned words.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
7. This Court has jurisdiction over the federal claims in this action under the Trademark Laws of
the United States, Lanham Act Sections 32, 39, 43 (a), and 43 (c)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1121 and
1125 (a)(c)(1), the Copyright Act 17, U.S.C. § 101 et seq. and the Judicial Code of the United States,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338 (a) and (b). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over any common law and
state statutory claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
8. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2), in that a substantial part
of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this judicial district and plaintiffs are doing business
within this judicial district.
9. This action arises out of defendant's improper use of the eBay VeRO Program to terminate auction
listings by the plaintiffs. The defendant alleged in an affidavit to eBay that an auction by the plaintiffs
was infringing because the plaintiffs used "Shabby Chic" to describe the product. A spokesperson representing
the defendant stated the plaintiffs were to "refrain from using the names SHABBY CHIC / Rachel Ashwell in your
title and description".
10. By this complaint, plaintiffs seek a Declaratory Judgment affirming the right under law use the term
"Shabby Chic" without further interference from the defendant. Plaintiffs seek a Declaratory Judgment
affirming the right to refer to Shabby Chic and Rachel Ashwell in disclaimers with these sales and any
other similar sales.
III. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Plaintiffs' Business
11. The plaintiffs manufacture a wide variety of fabric items from a selection of fabrics lawfully purchased through a variety of national outlets. In the course of business, the plaintiffs also buy and resell various collectibles and other items.
12. The plaintiffs offer these items for sale using the eBay internet auction site using the seller identification of Tabberone. They have been selling fabric items and collectibles on the internet auction since 1999.
13. The plaintiffs also maintain a web site, www.tabberone.com, through which fabric items and collectibles are also sold. This web site has been in continuous operation since 1999.
B. The Defendant and The Defendant's Unlawful Acts
14. The defendant is the holder of trademarks on the name "Shabby Chic" and "Rachel Ashwell", as well as others.
15. Based upon information and belief, around 1989, Rachel Ashwell formed the company Shabby Chic, at the same time filing for a federal trademark for the company name. Since the term "shabby chic" was already in wide use in the decorating field, the trademark application was invalid and should not have been approved.
16. Upon information and belief, the defendant aggressively protects the trademarked names. These actions include policing of internet auctions sites. On the auction sites, auctions using the words "shabby chic" have been terminated at the request of the defendant when the auctions have not offered products manufactured by Shabby Chic or have failed to meet Shabby Chic's "standards" for using their name.
17. Upon information and belief, Shabby Chic knows, or reasonably should have known, "shabby chic" is a generic term descriptive of particular style, or motif, of design, in wide use throughout the United States and other English speaking countries. The intimidation tactics used by Shabby Chic are therefore illegal and immoral. They rely on the fact people can't fight back because of the potential enormous legal expense.
1. Perjury
18. Based upon information and belief, on or about October 21, 2003, the defendant requested eBay terminate the auction listing by Tabberone, falsely alleging to eBay in an affidavit that the article offered in this auction was an infringing item. The false affidavit filed by the defendant constitutes perjury under 17 U.S.C Section 512.
2. Tortious Business Interference
19. By listing the item on eBay, a contract existed between the plaintiffs and eBay whereby eBay agreed to host the listing for a period of time. During that time it was reasonable to expect another party to place a bid on the item. Receiving a bid constitutes a binding contract to sell and to buy. The defendant reasonably knew contracts were in effect because the defendant had to look at the listings to affirm information used to terminate the auctions. The defendant improperly instructed eBay to terminate the auction listings effectively and unilaterally canceling the contracts that existed. This action resulted in loss of future revenue and good will to the plaintiffs. The action by the defendant constitutes tortious business interference under Colorado law.
3. Negligent Representation
20. Defendant made representations to eBay that plaintiff was engaged in an unlawful activity and violating federal laws.
22. The aforementioned representations to eBay were made in the course of business, profession and employment of the defendant as representative of Shabby Chic.
22. Such representations were false.
23. Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and competence in communicating said information to eBay.
24. Defendant should reasonably have expected that eBay would rely on said representations.
25. These representations have cost the plaintiff future sales and good will.
4. Fraudulent Representation
26. The aforesaid representations by the defendant, described in Paragraph 19, were false.
27. At the time said representations were made, the defendants knew that they were false or was indifferent as to their truth or falsity.
28. Said representations were material to eBay in deciding whether or not to terminate the auctions.
29. The defendant made said representations with the intent of inducing eBay to rely on them to terminate the auctions.
30. eBay did in fact, rely on the representations, and acted in accordance therewith in terminating the auctions, and such reliance was justifiable.
5. Outrageous Conduct
31. Defendant responded to the first email inquiry and ignored all others. Based upon information and belief, defendant's representative who terminated the auctions was not properly trained to judge whether there was a trademark infringement but merely "following orders" and lacked the training to handle subsequent inquiries.
32. Defendant's conduct towards plaintiffs, as described in paragraphs above, is so extreme in degree as to go beyond the bounds of decency and is regarded as atrocious and intolerable in a civilized community.
33. Defendant's acts were extreme and outrageous and were done with the intent to cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress.
IV. Communications
34. As stated above, defendant refused to reply to further inquiries as to the situation. The last inquiries were also sent to their counsel of record who did not respond either.
35. Shabby Chic does maintain an eBay VeRO "About Me" page as do many other corporations. It contains threatening language. In one FAQ statement, the defendant claims the activities listed "constitute trademark and trade name infringement that may subject you to civil liability including money damages and an injunction."
36. On the VeRO Page maintained by the defendant, the defendant claims: "Given the number of SHABBY CHIC items posted on eBay, it would take a very large commitment of time and money for Shabby Chic to contact each seller individually. Unfortunately, it is not possible for us to do so." The terminated auction had another six days before ending. More than enough time to make a reasonable inquiry.
37. Upon information and belief, the number of auctions shut down by Shabby Chic is not large enough to preclude reasonable contact before taking action or after taking action. The "canned" response to the initial inquiry indicates a corporate desire to interfere with legitimate business without being held responsible for their activities. The refusal of representatives of Shabby Chic to discuss the problem further is an indication of hostile intent.
38. Based upon the threatening demeanor of the "About Me" page, and the previously established lack of response by the defendant, the plaintiffs felt further communication would be fruitless. It was apparent these actions would continue. On October 27, 2003, plaintiffs filed a counter notice with eBay pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §512, sending copies to the defendant and counsel of record as could best be determined.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. COPYRIGHTS
1. First Sale Doctrine
39. The common-law roots of the first sale doctrine allows the owner of a particular copy of a work to dispose of that copy. This judicial doctrine was grounded in the common-law principle that restraints on the alienation of tangible property are to be avoided in the absence of clear congressional intent to abrogate this principle. This doctrine appears in section 109 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 109(a) specifies that this notwithstanding a copyright owner's exclusive distribution right under section 106 the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord that was lawfully made under title 17 is entitled to sell or further dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
40. The Plaintiffs lawfully purchased the cross stitch kit from Hobby Lobby, a retail outlet source. The subsequent re-sale of the cross stitch kit falls wholly under the First Sale Doctrine.
B. TRADEMARKS
1. Trademark Infringing Activities
41. "please refrain from using the names SHABBY CHIC / Rachel Ashwell in your title and description."
a. FAIR USE
42. The eBay listing plainly stated that the item was titled "Shabby Chic" and that it was a cross stitch kit manufactured in Bohemia, NY. The use of the title of the item was proper and lawful. It was used to describe the actual product being sold.
43. At no time has Shabby Chic indicated that they feel the cross stitch kit itself was infringing, only the use of the words "shabby chic" and "Rachel Ashwell".
44. It is a fundamental principle marking an outer boundary of the trademark monopoly that, although
trademark rights may be acquired in a word or image with descriptive qualities, the acquisition of such
rights will not prevent others from using the word or image in good faith in its descriptive sense, and
not as a trademark. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12-13
(2d Cir. 1976); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Holzwarth v. Hulse, 14 N.Y.S.2d 181, 181 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Johnson & Johnson v. Seabury & Johnson,
67 A. 36, 38 (N.J. 1907); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 28 (1995);
3A Louis Altman, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 21.24 (4th ed. 1983);
Margreth Barrett, Intellectual Property 760-61 (1995). The principle is of great importance because
it protects the right of society at large to use words or images in their primary descriptive sense, as
against the claims of a trademark owner to exclusivity. See U.S. Shoe, 740 F. Supp. at 198-199. This
common-law principle is codified in the Lanham Act, which provides that fair use is established where
"the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . .
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of . . .
[a] party, or their geographic origin." 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
45. The name Rachel Ashwell was used once and that was in conjunction with a prominent, and highlighted, disclaimer whose intent was to insure the prospective purchaser did not think the item was a licensed Shabby Chic, Inc. product.
46. Regardless whether the protected mark is descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful as used in
connection with the product or service covered by the mark, the public's right to use descriptive words or
images in good faith in their ordinary descriptive sense must prevail over the exclusivity claims of the
trademark owner. See Dowbrands, L.P. v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 963, 966-69 (D. Minn. 1994).
47. In short, fair use permits others to use a protected mark to describe aspects of their own goods, provided the use is in good faith and not as a mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). That is precisely the case here. The "offending" use described by the defendant is merely fair use to describe the product(s) offered for sale.
48. The fair use doctrine permits use of a protected mark by others to describe certain aspects of the
user's own goods. See CarFreshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995).
49. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adopts as a relevant factor the "physical nature of
the use in terms of size, location, and other characteristics in comparison with the appearance of other
descriptive matter or other trademarks." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §28 cmt. c. (1995).
The Restatement also observes that the scope of the fair use should be related to the degree to which the descriptive meaning is relevant to the goods with which it is associated in the alleged infringement, and whether there are other terms available to describe the pertinent characteristic. See id. Where a mark incorporates a term that is the only reasonably available means of describing a characteristic of another's goods, the other's use of that term in a descriptive sense is usually protected by the fair use doctrine. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992); 2 McCarthy, supra, §10:14 at 10-26 ("Since the use of a descriptive title cannot serve to prevent others from using the title in a descriptive, nontrademark sense, others may be able to use the title as the only term
available.").
50. As Justice Holmes clarified,
"A trade mark[sic] only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's
good will against the sale of another's product as his. . . . When the mark is used in a way that does
not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.
It is not taboo."
b. Disclaimers
51. The plaintiffs used a prominently positioned highlighted disclaimer in their eBay auction listing. Such use is prima facie evidence of lack of intent. The lack of positive statements indicating an affiliation affirms there is none in the mind of the buyer. The presence of a statement saying there is no affiliation solidly reinforces that fact to the buyer.
c. Unauthorized Use
52. Court after court refers to "counterfeiting" and "knockoffs" when applying the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act plainly refers to someone who, without authorization, uses or imitates another's mark in such a way as to possibly cause confusion. Confusion is the benchmark of Trademark Infringement. Without confusion there is no infringement. The plaintiffs have not counterfeited any products or marks. Re-sale of the cross stitch kit is covered under the First Sale Doctrine. No further authorization is required and since there is no confusion or counterfeiting of product or of marks, there is no violation of the Lanham Act.
C. VeRO Program
53. eBay has a Verified Rights Owners program called the VeRO Program® that allows verified rights owners to terminate auctions listings when the verified rights owner submits an affidavit stipulating the auction is "infringing" upon their copyright and/or trademark rights. The decision to terminate rests solely in the hands of the VeRO member. This gives the VeRO member the ability to cancel auctions even when the "offending" party, is in fact, within their legal rights to sell. Instead of being compelled to sue in federal court, the VeRO member can intimidate through auction cancellations and the threat of possible suspension from eBay should the offending activity continue.
54. Parties seeking to use the VeRO Program become members of eBay and are therefore subject to the rules and regulations of eBay. As such, Shabby Chic accepted and recognized that offering an item for auction is a pending contract to perform and to sell. When an item receives a bid, there is a binding contract to buy. Terminating an auction without cause, as alleged in this complaint, constitutes tortious interference with business on the part of Shabby Chic.
55. Additionally, the Shabby Chic VeRO representative knew, or reasonably should have known in their capacities as legal or quasi-legal representatives for intellectual property, that the item on auction that was terminated was not infringing, and therefore they willfully and knowingly committed perjury as defined in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Section 512 simply to intimidate and attempt to control the marketplace.
D. VeRO Page of Defendant
56. The defendant maintains a VeRO page on the eBay web site. This page contains a list of "conditions" and "permissible" renditions of the defendant's trademark. Acting in an authoritative manner, the defendant presents distorted demands that are not supported by federal law.
57. The page implies that the use of the description "shabby chic" automatically implies some sort of sponsorship or endorsement. There is no "automatic" assumption implied in the Lanham Act. A potential infringer must do something to "create" the impression of sponsorship or endorsement. This "blanket assumption" by Shabby Chic is not only incorrect but deliberately misleading.
58. On this VeRO page, Shabby Chic lays an absolute claim to all rights regarding the use of the phrase "shabby chic" in any context.
59. A similar page is on the Shabby Chic web site at www.shabbychic.com.
60. The defendant's VeRO page demands others use the registered symbol when referring to it's products, such as: "The room is decorated with Shabby Chic® brand furnishings. The room is decorated with Shabby Chic® fabrics". They do not follow their own demands on the Shabby Chic web site. Indeed, even the law firm of record for Shabby Chic does not properly refer to it's own client and it is an IP firm.
61. The demand by the defendant that persons listing licensed products use the register mark is unlawful in that trademark law only requires the mark holder and licensees to use the registered mark. The VeRO page infers that Shabby Chic will terminate auctions for not using the designated ® symbol.
E. Generic Trademark
62. A mark is generic when it "Identifies a class of product or service, regardless of source[.]"
Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59(4th Cir. 1996); see also
Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9("A generic term is one that refers, or has
come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a species");
Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035,
1039(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("A generic term is one commonly used to denote a product or other item or entity,
one that indicates the thing itself, rather than any particular feature or exemplification of it");
Miller Brewing Co v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 751, 54 L.Ed.2d 772 ("[A] generic or common descriptive term is one which is
commonly used as the name or description of a kind of goods"); S. S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet,
Inc., 598 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Generic terms are those which refer to a genus of which a
particular product is a species, without distinguishing its source or origin"); Surgicenters of Am., Inc.
v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979) ("A 'generic' term is one
that refers, or has come to be understood as referring', to the genus of which the particular product
or service is a species"); Convenient Food Mart, Inc. v. Convenient Mart, Inc, 690 F. Supp. 1457,
1460 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd by unpublished opinion, 870 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989). Rather than answering
the questions "Who are you?" and "Where do you come from?," generic marks tell the buyer what the product
is. 1 J. McCarthy, 405-6.
63. Shabby chic is a long recognized term for a style. It is referred to as a "popular decorating style, …(it) creates a old world atmosphere by contrasting distressed item with more luxurious pieces". Also, "lots of shabby looking white or light pastel colors blended together with architectural elements and a few faded barn wood type ladders". And "comfort, the beauty of imperfections, the allure of time-worn objects and the appeal of simple, practical living: These are the cornerstones of what has come to be known as the Shabby Chic style." The definitions are endless while somewhat consistent. None of the definitions, nor does Shabby Chic, attribute the origin of the style of fashion to Shabby Chic or its founder, Rachel Ashwell.
64. Further, even if a producer or provider has achieved secondary meaning in its generic mark through
promotion and advertising, the generic mark is still not entitled to protection because to allow
protection would "deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by
its name." See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9; see also Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at
143 n.4; Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (Pt Cir. 1980) ("No amount of
purported proof that a generic term has acquired secondary meaning associating it with a particular
producer can transform that term into a registrable trademark"); Reese Publ'g v. Hampton Int'l Communications,
620 F.2d 7, 12 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1980) (Evidence of secondary meaning "at most could have established
'de facto secondary meaning,' which cannot suffice to convert a generic term into a trademark");
Surgicenters, 601 F.2d at 1016 (A generic word "cannot be validly registered as a trademark even
if there is proof of secondary meaning").
65. The existence of synonyms for a term does not mean the term is not generic. There may be more than
one term which the consuming public understands as designating a category of goods." Loctite Corp. v.
National Starch & Chem. Co., 516 F.Supp. 190, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that "Super Glue,"
"Instant Glue," and "Ten Second Glue" are all generic); see also Blinded Veterans Ass'n. 872 F.2d at 1041
("A term need not be the sole designation of an article in order to be generic"); 1 McCarthy
§ 12:2 at 525-26; accord S. S. Kresge Co., 598 F.2d at 696; Convenient Food Mart, 690 F.Supp.
at 1462. Also, when a common English word is used as a mark for its ordinary meaning, it cannot be
appropriated for exclusive use because the mark is generic. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183,
1190 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he significant factor is not whether the word itself is common, but
whether the way the word is used in the particular context is unique enough to warrant trademark
protection"); see also, Blinded Veterans Ass'n, 872 F.2d at 1041-42 (based on plain meaning of
the words "blinded" and "veteran," the phrase "Blinded Veterans" is generic for an association of
once-sighted persons who served in the military); CES Publ'g Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc.,
531 F.2d 11 (2nd Cir. 1975) ("Consumer Electronics" is generic for electronic equipment purchased and
installed by consumers and, therefore, "Consumer Electronics Monthly is generic as a mark for a magazine title).
66. Had the defendant registered the name "Shabby Chic Fashions", or "Shabby Chic Furnishings", the use of the full name would not be generic. "Shabby chic", taken by itself, denotes nothing other than a particular fashion or motif. The term was in use long before Rachel Ashwell started her company.
67. If a term is generic, then regardless of whether one particular company or individual has succeeded in having the public think of that company/individual when they think of the term, the term nonetheless describes a genus, when the purpose of trademarks is to describe the species.
F. Use of Shabby Chic by Defendant and Others
68. "Shabby Chic" received registration from the PTO without proof of secondary meaning. This fact
creates a presumption that the mark is suggestive, and a strong presumption that the mark is valid.
See Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1529; see also 15 U.S.C. 1057(b). Hence, the burden, by a
preponderance of the evidence, is on the plaintiffs to prove that the mark is generic. See Glover,
74 F.3d at 59.
69. The plaintiffs note, notwithstanding the above, that registered marks are regularly held invalid
and canceled if generic. See Miller Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990 (holding that the term "light" or
"Lite" is generic for beer, thus allowing for the mark's cancellation). Further, Courts have found that
it is appropriate to cancel registered marks on motions for summary judgment. See Convenient Food Mart,
690 F.Supp. at 1461. Because competitors, the media and reference books use "shabby chic' as a common,
generic term to describe a particular feature of fashion, the plaintiffs argue that "shabby chic" is not
entitled to trademark protection.
70. When the term :shabby chic" is entered into the Altavista search engine on the internet, one of the first sponsored "hits" that is listed is from eBay touting:
Find Shabby Chic items on eBay
Shabby Chic items and more, now for sale on eBay. Find millions of products at low prices - all on eBay, the World's Online Marketplace
Even eBay doesn't use the "®" demanded by Shabby Chic. Even eBay regards "shabby chic" as a generic term because there is no "Shabby Chic" category on eBay as there are with many other name brand businesses.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above arguments, the plaintiffs firmly believe that the actions of Shabby Chic are calculated, improper, unethical and illegal and will continue unless stopped. Shabby Chic, like many other companies, is using the threat of federal court action to interfere with businesses conducting business legally and within the applications of federal law. The actions of Shabby Chic has caused harm, present and future, to the plaintiffs.
Therefore the plaintiffs request the court issue a declaratory judgment affirming:
1. That the term "shabby chic" is generic and the trademark(s) held by the defendant is invalid.
2. Using "shabby chic", either as a phrase or the words individually, is not infringing upon the trademark(s) held by the defendant.
3. Persons referring to, or selling licensed products manufactured by, the defendant are not required to use the registered symbol.
4. "Cease and Desist" letters (or emails) that reference the above items (2 & 3) are illegal and a violation of professional ethics.
5. Auctions terminated for reasons stated in 2 and 3 constitute tortious interference with business.
6. Auctions terminated for reasons stated in 2 and 3 constitute perjury under 17 U.S.C Section 512.
7. Plaintiffs request the court grant legal costs and any other reimbursements deemed to be appropriate.
8. Should the issues go to trial, the plaintiffs request a jury trial.
Respectively submitted this 27th day of October, 2003
_______________________________ ________________________________
Karen Dudnikov
Michael Meadors
3463 Maskoke Trail
P.O. Box 87
Hartsel, Colorado 80449
PRO SE PLAINTIFFS
303-913-4702
303-913-6075
Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of October, 2003, a true and correct copy of the Complaint was mailed, with a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons, postage prepaid, Priority Mail with delivery confirmation to:
John E. Kelly
Kelly Bauersfeld Lowry & Kelley, LLP
6320 Canoga Avenue Suite 1650
Los Angeles Co., Woodland Hills CA 91367