1997 B.C. Intell. Prop. & Tech. F. 121201
A Design for the Copyright of Fashion
Jennifer Mencken fnA
December 12, 1997
I. Introduction
Fashion apparel is a multi-billion dollar industry that has no national
boundaries. Designers[1], retailers and
consumers follow the game of international fashion. Within the last decade,
consumer knowledge of specific designers has increased dramatically. Magazines
and newspapers now cover the fashion industry as part of their national news
coverage, focusing on the ever-changing world of creative designer
expressions.[2] The general public has a ready
command of the names and faces of fashion models and the designers for which
they model. Countless television shows and feature films[3] exploit the fashion industry world. Consumers can now
recognize the distinct style of their favorite designers: Chanel, jersey-knit
double-breasted suits in contrast colors with trademarked brass buttons, and
quilted leather accessories; Gianni Versace, colorful handprinted silks with
reproduced 17th and 18th century illustrations; Issey Miyake, sparse
deconstructed gender neutral garments in natural fabrics or highly unnatural
polymers, which redefine both form and movement.[4]
In 1977, former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer stated that the issue of
design protection is "one of the most significant and pressing items of
unfinished business" of copyright revision.[5]
This issue remains unaddressed today, even though the need for revision is even
more significant, because garment designs lie along the fringe area of creative
expressions that exhibit the same qualities as protected matter. This paper
suggests that the traditional reasoning which denied certain articles copyright
protection is no longer reasonable, and that protection should now be extended
to garment designs. Further, this paper proposes solutions to the problems of
implementing copyright for fashion and what effect copyright will have on the
garment industry and consumers.
II. History of Non-Protection of Fashion
A. Reasoning Behind Non-Protection of Garment Design
Copyright protection is denied to garment designs due to the misconception
that garment designs are solely useful articles without any copyrightable
elements. Useful articles are granted limited protection under the Copyright
Act, provided there are elements of the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
that may be identified separately and can exist independently of the
utilitarian aspects of the article.[6] Since
1914, several bills[7] have been handed down to
Congress advocating the protection of the designs of useful articles through
copyright.[8] Such protection of garment
designs has always been opposed, however, for to do otherwise, would arguably
grant protection to a purely utilitarian article and pave the way for a
monopolies in the apparel market.
Although many garment designs maintain an underlying utilitarian function,
many designers have crossed the traditional boundaries of wearable apparel into
wearable art. The creations of haute couture[9], for example, are not meant to be worn as clothing, but
rather as an embodiment of all the design statements made in the ready-to-wear
line, albeit toned down.[10] Moreover,
subsequent copyright cases distinguish between a utilitarian object and its
artistic appearance, so that an object's artistic qualities may entitle it to
copyright protection despite its utilitarian function.[11] Under the reasoning followed in Barnhart v.
Economy Cover, aesthetic features of a useful article may be
protected when they are not in any way required or necessary for the
performance of the utilitarian function.[12]
Thus, one might reasonably conclude that most, if not all, garment designs
could be treated as protectable, for their aesthetic elements go far beyond the
simple function of clothing.[13] Considering
the nature of fashion as exhibited today, the policy of prohibiting copyright
in garment design is outdated and no longer serves the purpose of preserving
useful ideas for the general public.
¶5
The second reason for denying copyright to garment designs was the fear that
monopolies in the apparel market would be created.[14] A grant of copyright contains the exclusive ability to
control the subject matter[15] through
permissive use and arranged licenses.[16]
Thus, it was deemed to be in the best economic interest of the general public
to deny copyright protection and, in essence, encourage the theft and
reproduction of garment designs.[17] By
denying copyright, the valuable creations of designers would be widely copied,
making a garment, albeit of much lower quality, potentially available to
consumers of every income level. Similar to the policy reasons advanced, the
denial of copyright in order to promote social equality is no longer
applicable. Inherent in this reasoning is a belief in a finite number of
acceptable and valuable garment designs that will become controlled by a select
group of designers selling to the highest bidder. In comparison with countries
that do extend copyright to garment design, however, there have been no
monopolies of clothing created.[18] As with
any artistic endeavor, the number of possible creative expressions is only as
limited as the human mind, and in haute couture, no one has yet to stop
inventing.[19]
B. Attempts at Design Protection Through Other Areas of Law
A designer's unpublished work, in this case, not yet put on the market or
otherwise displayed to the public, may be protected under common law.[20] This is, however, hollow protection for
designers whose value in their creations depend on public awareness and buying
power. Thus, due to the denial of copyright protection for garment designs,
designers have looked to other areas of federal and state legislation, such as
design patents, trademark and unfair competition, and trade restrictions to
obtain protection for their creations.[21]
Just as with copyright, however, these attempts have proved unavailable or
ineffective.[22]
1. Design Patents
Under the design patent statutes, protection is granted to a "new, original
and ornamental design for an article of manufacture."[23] A design patent will protect the configuration or
ornamental elements of a product which gives a distinctive appearance.[24] In order to be eligible for protection the
article's design must be novel, non-obvious, ornamental and meet the test of
invention.[25] Garment designs have
consistently been held to have failed these requirements.[26] Even if the design patent statutes were modified to
allow inclusion of garment designs, the protection obtained would be useless.
The patent process is lengthy, most notably due to the prior art search,[27] which could be quite unwieldy with regard to
fashion elements. Design patents are most effective when the element sought
to be protected is used repeatedly and has a shelf life of many years.
Fashion, to the contrary, is notoriously ephemeral and transient; what is "in"
this season, is passè the next. Thus, designers could only seek to
prove retroactive infringement, after much of the revenue and importance of the
design has passed.[28]
2. Trademarks and Unfair Competition
Trademark law serves to protect the "mark-good" combination.[29] In order to receive protection, the trademark must be
employed with a certain product, such that the public recognizes the mark and
associates the elements and qualities of the product with the good.[30] An example of a trademark is the ubiquitous
Nike `swoosh.' The general public recognizes this graphic element as belonging
to a genuine Nike product, and thus expects a certain caliber of product to be
attached to the mark. While trademark law will protect that designer from
unauthorized use of the registered mark, in this case a designer's "label", it
will not protect the actual garment design. Under this reasoning, a
manufacturer could make an exact reproduction of a garment design, without
suffering any repercussions under trademark law. Moreover, the same
manufacturer could use the designer's name and marks to promote his copy as an
exact reproduction of the designer's work,[31]
thus bringing the "truth in advertising" theory to its most logical
conclusion.
In connection with a claim of trademark infringement, many designers have
attempted to protect their marks and creations by bringing claims of unfair
competition. In this way, a designer must show that the sale of a copy is
likely to confuse the public, because the public has acquired a "secondary
meaning"[32] for the mark. Although some
designers who repeatedly utilize their trademarks with their garments and
fabric patterns, such as Chanel, Mossimo, Gucci, and Louis Vuitton, may be
successful in pursuing such a claim, the majority of designers will be defeated
by the transient and seasonal nature of the industry.[33] This is exemplified by the number of cases where unfair
competition has been denied to fashion designers.[34]
3. Trade Restrictions
¶10
In 1932, garment designers decided to utilize self-help tactics against
manufacturers who were stealing their original designs.[35] The designers formed the Fashion Originators' Guild of
America (Guild) after being unable to elicit support or protection from
Congress or the courts.[36] The Guild was a
trade association of garment manufacturers and retailers who dealt with and
used the products of fashion designers.[37]
In order to accomplish their goal of eradicating design theft, retailers and
manufacturers pledged to only deal in original creations.[38] If a retailer failed to follow the provisions of the
Guild, their name would be included on a "red-card" which listed all
"non-co-operating retailers". Other Guild members were then forbidden to deal
with the red-carded retailer.[39] Although
the Guild was effective in stemming the theft of garment designs, in 1941 the
Supreme Court held that the Guild's practices violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act, thus ending the use of self-help trade restrictions.[40]
It seems, therefore, that copyright is the most appropriate method of
protecting the creative expressions of fashion designers. No other method is
effective to protect the property interest and value of the garment design or
the inherent and complicated nature of the industry. Courts, in denying the
protection of copyright and other legal remedies, have stated that copyright
protection would still provide a readily workable solution to the problems of
design theft, without impinging the free market of ideas.[41]
C. Fabric Pattern Protection
Currently the only available copyright protection for a designer's fashion
rests with the protection of the actual fabric design. An author's sole right
to the first printing and publishing of his work was adopted by the U.S.
Constitution from the English common law system and codified as the Copyright
Act of 1790.[42] The Act authorized Congress
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for a limited
time to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."[43] The word "writings" has
been broadly construed by the courts to include fabric designs, but
distinguishes the actual "dress design" as an unprotected useful article.[44] Fabric designs are deemed to be consistent
with the similarly copyrightable expressions of paintings and other pictorial
or graphic materials.[45]
While the copyright of a fabric design does afford a fashion designer some
protection, it only extends to the actual fabric and not the garment that is
created from it. Many designers do not create their own fabric, instead they
buy cloth from manufacturers without taking any assignment of its copyright.
As a result, the value of any recovery for infringement of a copyrighted fabric
pattern would be limited to the value of the fabric as cloth, not as the
garment or product created with the fabric. Assuming the designer actually
creates his own patterns, protection for fabric is only offered if the designer
uses fabric with intricate and complicated patterns and designs. Still, the
copyright protection is extremely narrow, for it is judged under the "ordinary
viewer" test. Copyright infringement may be inferred when proved that a
defendant had access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarities to
the protected material exist.[46] Even if a
plaintiff can show access, there is no infringement when the similarities
between the works are insufficient to prove copying.[47] The test then asks whether "the ordinary observer,
unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same."[48] It is not inconceivable then, under this standard, that
most fabric designs would fail to be protected unless there is evidence of
egregious copying by the defendant.[49]
Nonetheless, fabric designs are routinely copied, or euphemistically, "used for
inspiration" by other fabric designers in creating other patterns.[50]
III. Reasons to Protect Garment Designs Through Copyright
On May 2, 1991, the Copyright Office (Office) issued a Notice of Inquiry to
the public requesting comments on the Office's practices regarding the
registerability of three-dimensional garment or costume designs.[51] The Office wished to maintain settled copyright
principles concerning conceptual separability and the useful article doctrine.
It stated that marketability and aesthetic quality would continue to be
excluded from consideration.[52] The Office
solicited commentary on four main policy questions, three of which were of
great importance to the fashion industry, as they could have resulted in a
change of policy for certain garment designs.[53] The Office, however, continued to uphold the
traditional, restrictive interpretations of the Copyright Act and its
pictorial and graphic provisions.[54] These
provisions would not allow garment designs copyright protection even if they
contained ornamental features or were intended to be used as historical or
period dress.[55] The Office, having
received many public comments arguing for a broader availability of copyright
protection to include garment designs, advised those interested parties to seek
Congressional revision of the Copyright Act.[56] Until such a revision, the Office would continue to draw
the line "between works of imagination (masks and some costumes) and works of
utility (garments)".[57]
A. Monopoly in Clothing Does Not Exist
¶15
Regardless of what existed in the garment industry during the earlier part of
this century, it can no longer be said that designers have a monopoly over
garment production.[58] Every major city has
a fashion center and encourages startup companies to design and create new
work. While there continues to exist a cadre of established design houses in
Paris, such as Chanel, Dior, and Yves Saint Laurent, the current design market
is dominated by young designers who push the boundaries of fashion.[59] In 1977, there were over 15,000 apparel
industry establishments creating work for every economic level.[60] Further, the French system of copyright, in comparison
to Europe's, has protected garment designs since 1793[61], and there has obviously been no hindrance to either the
industry's ability to create new designs or to the public's ability to purchase
clothing. In fact, an opposite effect has taken hold, as many European
designers now refuse to sell certain garments across the Atlantic.
B. Architectural and Technical Drawings Protection Inequity
The interpretation of the Copyright Act and its policies have created many
inequities with respect to the useful article doctrine. Perhaps none more so
than the allowance of copyright protection for technical drawings,
architectural renderings, and the actual products of the architecture. Under
the current Act, a drafter of architectural or technical drawings may copyright
his work as pictorial or graphic expression.[62] While giving some credence to the argument that
architectural and technical renderings contain aesthetic elements, these
renderings are used exclusively for utilitarian purposes. In comparison to
architectural renderings, it is difficult to comprehend why a garment design
fails to achieve protection.[63]
C. Comporting with International Copyright Standards
On March 1, 1989[64], the United States
officially entered the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention), helped to pass the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 (BCIA)[65], and
subsequently ratified the treaty.[66] In
adopting the Berne Convention provisions, the United States only complied with
its minimum requirements.[67] The rights and
responsibilities relating to copyright matters are now to be resolved under
domestic law, not under the provisions of the international treaty.[68]
This has led to some conflicts regarding the protection afforded to copyright
holders.[69] While other conflicts have been
resolved in favor of the authors' rights[70],
the protection of fashion designers remains a contradiction. Under
international rules, the creative works of fashion designers are protected by
copyright, albeit for a limited term.[71] The
works which are protected against pirating in Europe receive no such protection
in the U.S.[72] Thus, each time a designer
shows new work, it may be copied exactly and reproduced for sale in the U.S.
In addition, the design copier may use the original designer's name in his
advertisement.[73]
The U.S. constantly alleges that other countries are not doing enough to
protect the copyrighted works of American authors,[74] yet fails to extend its own copyright protection for
certain works, most notably the creations of fashion designers. This inequity
undermines the fashion design markets in the U.S.[75] Many designers are also powerless to combat the effect
of the resulting grey goods market, although international laws attempt to
prohibit the importation of such products.
D. Garment Designs Are Not Solely Useful Articles
¶20
The effect of fashion can be seen in the dramatic changes of style within any
century. New trends do not exhibit any changes in the ultimate utility of
clothing,[76] but rather a designer's effect
on tastes. Moreover, utility as well as art, in the context of copyright law,
are concepts of legal fiction. In reality, that which is useful is just as
likely to be viewed as art as the artistic is treasured for its utility.[77] Today, fashion is more akin to "wearable
art." Even though the court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography, [78] warned that anything could be viewed as art
in context, the court in Keiselstein-Cord, made specific mention of the
plaintiff's inclusion of the permanent collections of certain museums.[79]
It has been well recognized that the "chief value of a `quality' dress lies,
not so much in the quality of the material, as in the smartness and originality
of the design."[80] While an obvious element
of utility is usually inherent in garment designs, the primary purpose and
value to the designer lie in their appearance. Because copyright law aims to
protect and encourage creative works of art, allowing protection for garment
designs poses no contradiction to the underlying policy.[81]
Garment designers have attempted, to no avail, to rely on other areas to
protect their intellectual property rights. In fact, the courts which have
denied the use of other remedies have stated that the most applicable and most
reasonable solution to the quandary of garment designs is the extension of
copyright protection. Unfortunately the legislature has been wary of such an
extension. The 1991 call for comments by the Copyright Office, however, shows
that the federal government is not unamenable. Rather, it appears to be
looking for an argument that would not only withstand a useful article debate,
but also a more politicized debate that copyright protection is being extended
too far.[82]
IV. Implementation of Fashion Design Copyright
Beyond the mere establishment of fashion design copyright, there are
additional problems regarding the efficient implementation of new protection.
In addition to offering solutions to practical concerns, this paper suggests
formulating a doctrine to determine which elements of a garment design may be
protected by copyright. As with all useful articles, the grant of copyright is
conditioned on the existence of separate aesthetic elements. Although there is
an argument against incorporating only one method of inquiry into the
conceptual separability test, this paper seeks to only use the test that would
better represent the garment industry.
A. Conceptual Separability of Fashion's Artistic Elements From the
Functionality of Clothing: The Need for Revision
Under current copyright law, useful, functional articles are denied protection
based in part on a belief that when creating a particular manifestation of a
useful article, an artist will receive comprehensive protection that exceeds
the original expression of its particular aesthetic qualities. Courts do not
want to foreclose competitors from using the same design, thus depriving
consumers of the useful article's benefits.
¶25
Clothing is inherently functional. However, fashion designer's creations,
especially those pieces considered haute couture, are not meant to be worn as
everyday clothing, or even as once-in-a-lifetime clothing. They are created as
expressions of the designer's creativity and to keep the designer's name in the
minds of the fashion media and buyers.
In the language of the Copyright Act of 1976, a useful article is "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely used to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information."[83] A useful article need not be a complicated device that
can only be expressed within a limited number of designs.[84] Additionally, "an article that is normally a part of a
useful article is considered a useful article."[85] Such an article enjoys copyright protection "only to the
extent that [its] design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified from, and are capable of existing separately
from the utilitarian aspects of the article."[86] Determining the separability of the useful article's
utilitarian function from its artistic features is the paramount concern of a
court when considering the appropriateness of copyright protection.[87]
Ordinarily, the distinction between protectable works of authorship and useful
articles works perfectly well, barring copyright in purely technological
advances, processes and functional works.[88]
A dilemma arises, however, when the attraction of a useful article does not
necessarily arise from the article's "intrinsic utilitarian function".[89] Rather, a peculiar attribute or design can
appeal to a consumer's aesthetic notions, regardless of the utilitarian
application or function of the article.[90]
This is the realm into which fashion design falls; to the consumer, the item's
appearance is of paramount importance, whereas the utilitarian aspect is
incidental.[91]
Separating the purely aesthetic elements from the intrinsically functional
elements of the useful article generates problems for courts. Currently, there
is no clear guideline for such determination because numerous sources of
authority espouse different methods for determining copyright protection.[92] Such confusion has resulted in courts
erring on the side of underprotection under a strict formalism, even though the
useful article contains a particular visual appeal.[93]
1. The Majority Approach to Separability: Physical and Conceptual
For a useful article to be copyrightable, the court must first consider if the
artistic element of the article is separable from its utilitarian
application.[94] When aesthetics can
physically separate the artistic elements from the article without also
removing its intrinsic utilitarian function, the analysis is relatively
simple.[95] If the aesthetic element may not
be so removed, the Registry of Copyright and the courts look to the possibility
of "conceptually" separating the artistic element from the useful article.[96] Unlike physical separability, conceptual
separability recognizes that a useful article can contain both aesthetic and
functional elements and still merit copyright protection. As critics point
out, however, current interpretations of conceptual separability could leave a
court determining the nature of the aesthetic elements and ultimately deciding
upon the level of artistic merit.[97]
¶30
Because the aesthetic nature of fashion and fashion design is inexorably
linked with the utilitarian function of clothing, for most designs, copyright
protection can only be viewed under a conceptual separability test. Based on
the current interpretations of the conceptual separability doctrine, most, if
not all fashion designs would fail. Under Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy
Cover Corp., the court's majority only interpreted the forms objectively,
as detached from other possible connotations.[98] Thus, even though the forms had other uses, the court
ruled that an average viewer would always associate the form with the function
of mannequin, not as a statue or other use. It seems then almost impossible to
show an average consumer a designer dress and expect him or her to see anything
other than a dress. In order to put real meaning into a grant of copyright
protection for fashion designers, the copyright must not be so easily
vulnerable to attack. This will require a new interpretation of conceptual
separability.
2. Conceptual Separability Under the Creative Process Model
A more appropriate focal point for courts determining the protection of useful
articles is the creative process, rather than the useful article itself.[99] Thus, the motivations of the artist who
creates the article dictate whether the ultimate function of the article is
aesthetic or utilitarian.[100] The mere
fact that the article contains both elements does not immediately discount the
availability of protection, but rather furthers the spirit behind copyright
protection for objects that add to the cultural, creative and artistic wealth
of the society.[101] Properly implemented,
this interpretation will provide expanded protection for otherwise unprotected
useful articles. The creative process model, however, may prove completely
unworkable in the practical courtroom setting, as it ultimately depends on
whether or not a designer can prove and record the pure artistic creative
process behind the useful article.[102] The
court may find itself deciding the artistic merit of an object, contrary to
the long held principal of avoiding such decisions.[103] Further, this model assumes that there will be a
recognizable difference in the creative processes, such that the artistic
element may be discerned from the utilitarian and that a reasonable trier of
fact would be able to comprehend the difference between the creative process of
a fashion designer and that of a mere clothing manufacturer. [104]
3. The Temporal Displacement Test
Judge Newman, dissenting in Barnhart, delineated a different approach
to conceptual separability for useful articles.[105] According to Newman, "for the design features to be
conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the useful article that
embodies the design, the article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a
concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian
function."[106] This approach has become
known as the "temporal displacement" test.[107] It recognizes that the decision regarding whether an
item is able to exist as art, despite its utility, is ultimately in the eyes of
the beholder.[108] Because every useful
article could be held as "art" by at least one person, the boundaries of what
is protectable have been eradicated. Further, the creative motivations of the
artist or designer are meaningless.[109]
4. The Polakovic Approach to Conceptual Separability
According to Professor Polakovic, the proper standard for determining which
useful articles are to be protected rests in the combination of the creative
process approach and temporal displacement approach.[110] His analysis would take into account the creative
process of both the designer and the artist, while taking a more accommodating
view of the artistic contributions of the designer.[111] Designs that achieve their aesthetic appeal solely
from their utilitarian function would not be protected. [112] Thus, the designer would first be
treated as an artist, one whose medium deserves protection when it does not
amount to an application of a utilitarian function.[113]
5. Application of the Polakovic Model
Under Polakovic's approach, the fashion designer would receive the same
treatment as any other artist. Although not all the designs created would be
protected under this model, the fashion designer would have a better chance
proving that his creations are art and engendered with creative process, even
though he has expressed himself through the medium of fabric. The main
obstacle for the designer will be the court's decision regarding the underlying
idea behind the useful article and whether the elements of the useful article
are viewed as either ideas or expressions of that idea. In other words, the
court will determine the level of abstraction.
¶35
In deciding whether a useful article is inherently functional, as opposed to
aesthetic, the designer will want applied the most abstract level of function
possible. If the court determines the utility of a fashion designer's product
based upon a strict functional standard, such as "formal all-black sequinned,
sleeveless evening dresses," the designer will have a lesser chance of
receiving copyright protection than if the article is judged against a broad
abstract "clothing" standard. If the court characterizes the article as
clothing, each element or adornment to the article may be considered
conceptually separable and thus, capable of receiving copyright protection. To
illustrate this point, consider two recent cases concerning the
copyrightability of costumes.
In Whimsicality Inc. v. Rubie's Costumes Co., the court determined that
a costume serves the utilitarian function of allowing the wearer to
masquerade.[114] Thus, the motivation of
the artist was to create a costume, and the actual production of such an
article, under this strict interpretation, will automatically be refused
copyright.[115] If, however, a court
applies a broader and more abstract analysis, as it did in National Theme
Products, Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck Inc., a costume, although a useful article
with which one masquerades, is deemed to be mere clothing.[116] As a result, the costume would be amenable to
copyright protection, for the intentions of the artist were to create a
particular, adorned article of clothing that does not constitute an
unprotected, useful article under the Copyright Act.[117] Practically, the trier of fact in an action for
infringement would need to be acquainted with both the complexities of a
particular application and the difficulties of resolving these complexities
when creating a single design and attempting to give the article its aesthetic
appeal.[118]
Even assuming the legislature allowed copyright protection for these
expressions, the current approach of the courts is too comprehensive and would
all but eliminate the copyrightability of a fashion design. The proper
approach is to determine: 1) why the useful article is appealing; and 2)
whether the source of its appeal is an imperative component of its function.[119] As a result, only those articles which
derive their aesthetic appeal from their utilitarian application would be
denied protection.[120] This would allow
other designers to make innovative and creative designs based on underlying
functionality, while still preserving protection in the artistic expression of
the original designer.[121]
B. Requirements for Implementation
In creating a copyright system which recognizes the expressions of designers,
many old fears, such as burdening the consumer and creating a marketplace
monopoly, resurface. With tens of thousands of designers churning out work, it
is easy to foresee chaos. How far does the copyright extend? For how long?
What would constitute infringement?
1. Scope of Copyright
Garments are popular and desirable to the public because of the selection and
arrangement of their materials, style and quality. Many of their actual
elements are not new expressions, but appropriate ideas within the public
domain. No designer would argue that a hem was a new expression, much less a
seam or button closure. Like the photograph in Burrow-Giles v.
Sarony, it is the selection and arrangement of the finished
product which provides value and therefore deserves protection as creative
expression.[122] It is also a
well-established industry practice to be inspired by the work of other
designers when creating your own work.[123]
The result is a necessarily thin copyright which provides protection for
garment designs from outright theft but does not seek to completely overburden
the copyright system.
2. Limited Duration
¶40
In an industry which waits with bated breath for the next big trend and
seasonal fashion changes, a garment design has its greatest value when it is
new and may only have a shelf life of a few months. Yet, in order to protect
against monopoly, there should be a special duration limit applied to the
protection of garment designs. By allowing protection for only one year,
designers will have adequate time to recoup costs of their design development
and receive the greatest benefit from their creation.[124] This duration would also comport with the limit of
garment design copyright available in Europe.[125]
3. Compulsory License System
If copyright is extended to garment designs, it is reasonable to assume that
designers will seek protection for their designs and then license them. One of
the arguments against extending protection is the potential for large numbers
of infringement actions. This problem might be successfully eliminated by
incorporating a compulsory license system.[126] Such a system is not new to the world of copyright.
It would avoid the need for individual negotiations over license fees and allow
small manufacturers to benefit from the work of larger designers.[127]
Just as with the compulsory license system for phonorecords, manufacturers who
feel that a particular design is valuable would be able to make reproductions
of the garment for a statutory fee.[128]
Such a license, however, would only allow the manufacturer to make his own
interpretation of the design, not an exact replica. Under the current system,
this is the same process already followed by some manufacturers: the design is
copied and reproduced in different fabrics or with slight changes in the
design.[129] In addition to the monetary
benefits of a compulsory license system, the system would also reduce the need
for a court to foray into the "artistic realm" it so clearly wishes to avoid.[130]
V. Effect on Industry
The claim of copyright is primarily based on a moral right of the creator of a
work and a society's desire to reward this labor. In this case, copyright
serves to legitimize the artistic endeavors of the designer. The claim of
copyright for garment design, however, is also related to the need for economic
incentives.[131] The denial of copyright
for clothing has only marginally protected the welfare of the general public
and has ignored the need for a designer's economic incentive.[132] It is clear that the lack of copyright protection in
the U.S., as well as the existence of protection in Europe, has not changed the
ability of designers to create new garments each season. Nor has there been
any adverse effect on the power of the public to purchase garments made by
quality designers at reasonable prices.[133]
Opponents to the extension of copyright protection for fashion designers argue
that, based on pure statistical information, the lack of copyright protection
has benefited both the public and the apparel industry. Designers have only
had to surrender a small portion of their profits to manufacturers who steal
and reproduce their designs. Further, they argue, the pirate's ability to take
this property from the designers, along with the designer's name, provides
indirect advertising for the designer, which ultimately benefits the designer's
market share. By all accounts, the fashion industry has blossomed in recent
years, and many designers are posting record profits.
¶45
The profits of designers can not be causally related to the lack of copyright
protection in the marketplace. Rather, these profits result from public demand
and designer ingenuity. The denial of copyright protection in garment designs
sanctifies the outright theft of a designer's creative work. This threat to
marketplace viability actually drives up the cost of designer goods, resulting
in fewer consumers being able to purchase the garments.[134] The denial of the economic incentives of copyright
protection has also forced the industry to seek out other methods of economic
benefit. In order to recapture a greater share of the market,[135] many designers developed lower cost lines, which
reflected some of the concepts of the haute couture lines, but with cheaper
fabrics and reduced quality.[136] In this
instance, the designer aims to limit the development cost, so as to compete
effectively with the pirates.[137] The
ultimate loss, however, is borne by the consumer who has decreased access to
high quality garments.[138]
If copyright protection is extended to garment designs, it will not likely
have significant effect between designers. True, if a designer infringes upon
another's work (and there are rumors of designers trying to steal another's
"ideas") there can be an action for infringement. However, the case law in
Europe indicates that designers understand that there is a certain level of
inspiration and similar themes in each season, and have not been suing each
other rampantly over infringement. Rather, as the Yves Saint Laurent
case shows, an action for infringement arises when there is an exact copy made.
By adopting a limited duration and compulsory license system, the fear of
increased litigation is put to rest. If there is a particularly valuable
design, a manufacturer can simply pay the customary license and produce his own
version of the garment.
VI. Conclusion
The question of whether or not to grant copyright protection should consider
the work of the designers and their economic interest, rather than the desires
of the general public. The mere fact that an industry has been able to devise
other methods of upkeeping its financial stability should not be a reason to
deny creative expression protection. By continuing to deny proper protection,
economic incentive is displaced to design pirates, who create no new material,
thus undermining the copyright policy by adding to the public's cultural
welfare. Under a system of copyright protection, the public view on the world
of fashion design would not change considerably from the one we all currently
know. The number of designers would not increase any more rapidly than it has
because the copyright system is not a major economic incentive for fashion
designers who have lived so long without it. The basis for granting copyright
protection lies in awarding the author a moral right to his creation. In
actuality, a garment design copyright only punishes the pirate, who
deliberately copies the design, while benefiting the true creators and the
public.
Footnotes
[a]Jennifer Mencken, BFA California State
University Fullerton 1992, JD candidate Boston College Law School 1998. The
author wishes to thank Professor Alfred Yen, Kristen Mathews and the IPTF staff
for comments to this paper.
[1] Designers are defined as creators of garment
styles which typically feature high quality materials and construction.
Designers create their own patterns and styles, creating the trends which
design pirates seek to follow by explicit copying.
[2] Following the fashion industry has become an
increasingly common pastime as well; the European Travel Commission sponsored
an advertisement supplement detailing the fashion industry and how to plan a
European vacation around it. See Kit Barnes, The Passion for
Fashion, Your Invitation to Europe (advertising supplement), N.Y. TIMES,
October 6, 1996. This supplement was also included in the WASHINGTON POST and
the BOSTON GLOBE.
[3] Numerous documentaries have been made about
the fashion industry. Many networks and cable channels have created new series
which feature designers, models and the industry. Two feature films made in
1995 pertained to fashion: Unzipped, a work depicting the life of
designer Isaac Mizrahi, and Robert Altman's comedy, Pret-è-porter
(Ready To Wear). Even the film Clueless showcased the work of designers
Alaôa and Calvin Klein.
[4] Many designers go through a creative process
similar to that of traditional visual artists: their expressions are borne by
the wish to communicate an idea. For the designer, the medium is fabric; for
the visual artist, canvas or bronze. Garment designs reference the same
artistic movements found in art and architecture, including minimalism,
pop-art, post-modernism, and deconstructionism. Many museums, such as the
Victoria and Albert Museum, London; Bayerisches National Museum, Munich; The
Louvre, Paris, exhibit the works of designers as part of their art
collections.
[5] See Barbara Ringer, The Unfinished
Business of Copyright Revision, 24 UCLA L. REV. 951, 976 (1977).
[6] See 17 U.S.C. ß 101 (1994).
[7] For a complete list of the bills submitted
before 1979, see Rocky Schmidt, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for
Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. REV. 861, n.30 (April 1983)[hereinafter
Schmidt]; Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss cites 71 design
protection bills).
[8] See H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Ses.
tit. II (1975) (would have created a form of copyright for "original" designs
of a useful article, even though they failed to meet the design patent standard
of "novelty.") See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Ses. 50 (1976).
Although Title II would not have protected the three-dimensional features of
garments, the Copyright Office and the Commerce Department strongly supported
the bill because of the scarcity of available protection. See Copyright
Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 95, 161-169, 171-72, 1008-09 (1975). Title
II was deleted from the 1976 Act in part because of the extremely wide scope of
protection it granted. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476 at 50.
[9] The function of haute couture is to create
fantastic creations that may or may not be conceivable beyond the runway.
Ready-to-wear creations are typically purchased for retail.
[10] Haute couture shows are financial losing
propositions. The pieces are usually made in small lots of 10 garments of
less. A successful haute couture show, however, previews the designer's
ready-to-wear show, and keeps that work in the mind of the retail buyers.
Designers usually recoup the haute couture losses on the ready-to-wear
lines.
[11] See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954) (china statuettes in the shape of dancers held copyrightable despite
their use as bases for electric lamps); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (design for belt buckle protected by
copyright) ; Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (pencil sharpener encased in simulated antique telephone held to be
copyrightable work of art). But see, Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (figurative mannequin forms denied
protection); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (light fixture housing denied copyright).
[12] See Barnhart, 773 F.2d 411
(distinguishing the mannequins from the Kieselstein-Cord belt buckles by
noting the ornamental dimensions were "wholly unnecessary" for the belt buckle
to act as a belt buckle).
[13] In a temperate environment, one might
assume that a simple uniform of turtleneck and pants would be the minimum
required for protection from the elements and prurient interests, thus any
additions to such a uniform would be unnecessary for the garment to function as
clothing.
[14] See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
supra note 8 at 50.
[15] See U.S. Const. art. I, ß 8,
cl. 8.
[16] See Schmidt, supra note 7
at 867-68.
[17] See Millinery Creators' Guild v.
FTC, 109 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1940) (noting that design piracy exerts a downward
force on prices and is therefore a socially desirable form of competition),
aff'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d
279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930) (refusing
to outlaw design piracy on grounds that to do so would afford a virtual
monopoly to the creator of an unpatented and uncopyrighted design).
[18] European countries which allow copyright
show no evidence of clothing monopolies or shortages.
[19] Opponents would argue that providing
copyright would eliminate the ability of designers to be inspired by each
other's work and the prior art. As with songs and other artworks, there is
nothing in the copyright laws which would prohibit new creations inspired by
the old. Copyright seeks only to give the author exclusive use of his
expression and prohibit infringement. Ideas alone do not merit copyright
protection.
[20] See Margolis v. National Bellas
Hess Co., 139 Misc. 738, 741, 249 N.Y.S. 175, 179 (1931), aff'd, 235
A.D. 839, 257 N.Y.S. 912 (1932).
[21] See Schmidt, supra note 7
at 867.
[22] See id.
[23] See 35 U.S.C. ßß
171-173 (1994).
[24] See Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp.,
199 F. Supp. 797, 804 (D. Del. 1961); Kanne & Bessant, Inc. v. Eagelet
Metal Spinning Co., 54 F.2d 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
[25] See Western Elec. Mfg. Co. v.
Odell, 18 F. 321, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1883) (designs patents require a high degree
of inventive or originative faculty). See also Gold Seal Importers v.
Morris White Fashions, Inc., 124 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1941) (in denying
patent for woman's handbag design court stated: "it is not enough for
patentability to show that a design is novel, ornamental and pleasing in
appearance ... it must be the product of invention; that is, the conception of
the design must require some exceptional talent beyond the range of the
ordinary designer familiar with the prior art").
[26] See e.g., Belding Heminway Co. v.
Future Fashions, Inc., 143 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1944) (per curiam); White
v. Lenore Frocks, Inc., 120 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1941) (per curiam);
Neufeld-Furst & Co. v. Jay-Day Frocks Inc., 112 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1940);
Nat Lewis Purses, Inc. v. Carole Bags, 83 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1936) (per
curiam).
[27] See 37 C.F.R. ß 1.104(a)
(1982), see also In Re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1021 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
[28] See Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners
& Gordon, 112 F. Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Cheney Bros. v. Doris
Silk, 35 F.2d 279 (2nd Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 788 (1930).
[29] See 15 U.S.C. ß 1051 et seq.
(1994), commonly known as the Lanham Act.
[30] This is the so-called "secondary meaning"
test, which states that the original trademark has become so associated in the
minds of the public that the mark is solely identified with the original goods,
and that public confusion would ensue if another's similar mark was allowed
into the public marketplace.
[31] Copyists have been held to have a right
to truthfully advertise that their goods are copies of a designer, and
therefore to have a right to utilize the designer's name and label. See
e.g., Sociètè Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniëre
Establissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dept. Stores, 299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1962); Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728 (N.D. Ill. 1883); Jaccard
v. R.H. Macy & Co., 265 A.D. 15, 37 N.Y.S. 2d 570 (1942); Ellis v. Hurst,
70 Misc. 122, 128 N.Y.S. 144 (1910), aff'd per curiam, 145 A.D.
918, 130 N.Y.S. 1110 (1911).
[32] See supra note 30.
[33] The ability of designers to prove
secondary meaning and public confusion would be increased if the ordinary
purchaser standard was replaced with a purchaser knowledgeable of haute couture
and designers. Considering the increased spending and public awareness of
designers and their creations, this would not be an unreasonable adjustment.
[34] See e.g., Wm. Filene's Sons Co. v.
Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., 90 F.2d 556, 559-60 (1st Cir. 1937);
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); Swank, Inc.
v. Anson, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D.R.I. 1951).
[35] See Schmidt, supra note 7
at 871 (citing Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235 (1944)).
[36] See id.
[37] See id.
[38] See Fashion Originators' Guild of
Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-62 (1941).
[39] See id. at 462-63. The court in
Fashion Originators found based on 1936 market figures that the Guild
controlled 60% of the dress market (selling for $10.75 or more), but only 38%
of the $6.75 and up dress market. See id. at 462.
[40] See id. at 466. The Court
reasoned that the Guild constituted a monopoly over the garment market, and
lessened competition.
[41] See Belding Heminway Co. v. Future
Fashions, Inc., 143 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1944) (per curiam)
("...what the makers of women's dresses really need is copyright protection,
which Congress has hitherto denied them."); White v. Lenore Frocks, Inc., 120
F.2d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 1941) (per curiam) ("...[fashion designers] need
a statute which will protect them against the plagiarism of their designs.");
Nat Lewis Purses, Inc. v. Carole Bags, 83 F.2d 475, 476 (2d Cir. 1936) (per
curiam) ("...new designs ought to be entitled to a limited copyright.");
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281, cert. denied, 281
U.S. 728 (1929) ("...there should be a remedy, perhaps by an amendment of the
Copyright Law.").
[42] See U.S. Constitution, art. I
ß 8; 17 U.S.C. ß 101 et seq. (1790).
[43] See U.S. Constitution. art. I
ß 8.
[44] See e.g., Millworth Converting
Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443 (2d. Cir. 1960) (Millworth II); Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
[45] See e.g., Millworth II, 276 F.2d
at 443; Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 487.
[46] See Folio Impressions, Inc. v.
Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Walker v. Time Life
Films, 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159
(1986).
[47] See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
[48] Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489;
see Walker, 784 F.2d at 51.
[49] See e.g., Millworth Converting
Corp. v. Slifka, 180 F. Supp. 840, 841-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Millworth I)
(plaintiffs created a fabric design and printed it on several different
backgrounds, all of which defendants infringed by exactly repeating the design
and backgrounds); Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, 490 F.2d
1092, 1093 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (infringement found when
defendant took swatch of plaintiff's fabric and attempted to make as close a
replica without actually infringing).
[50] See Soptra, 490 F.2d at 1093.
[51] See 56 FR 20241, issued by
Copyright Office, Library of Congress, May 2, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Lexis Library, LOC File. Because costumes contain many similarities to
the garment industry, and lie along the threshold of copyrightable subject
matter, questions and revisions of policy have substantial effect on the
fashion industry. The majority of responses came from the garment industry.
[52] See id.
[53] See id. The Copyright Office
asked in essence: (1) Are all costumes useful articles? (2) Can a line be
drawn by the Copyright Office permitting registration of three-dimensional
aspects of costume designs, ... while denying registration of designs of
clothing ...? (3) If certain three-dimensional design elements of garments or
costumes should be protected, what standards [specifically the separability
test] should be applied? (4) Does the intention of the artist or designer have
any relevance in determining whether ... [the] aesthetic features [are]
separate from the functional purpose?
[54] See 56 FR 56530, Copyright Office,
Library of Congress, November 5, 1991, available in microform.
[55] See id. at par. 4. The historical
or period dress exclusion eliminates protection for garments that could be
intended to serve as costumes. This specific exclusion is particularly harsh
considering the considerable creative effort employed in designing a garment to
develop the fashion sensibilities previously only portrayed in a painting of
Marie Antoinette, for example, into a tangible three-dimensional creation. The
policy would allow masks to be treated as protected subject matter, while only
protecting those costume designs which pass the conceptual separability test
and upon a finding of identifiable authorship. See id.
[56] See id. at par. 6.
[57] See id. at par. 8.
[58] The public no longer manufacturers the
majority of its clothing by hand, as was done during the early part of this
century when the major garment decisions came down.
[59] The works of Dolce & Gabbana, Todd
Oldham, Jean Paul Gaultier, and countless others all command more press and
profits than many of the older houses.
[60] See Schmidt, supra note 7
at fn.122 (citing AMERICAN APPAREL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, FOCUS: ECONOMIC
PROFILE OF THE APPAREL INDUSTRY 16-17 (1980)).
[61] Garment designs were protected as applied
art under the Copyright Act of 1793. See Schmidt, supra note 7
at fn.94.
[62] A designer's illustration of a new design
may be protected under copyright as a pictorial or graphic work. However, many
designers do not obtain such protection because it offers no protection or
benefit. The copyright protects the right to creative derivative works, but
this only applies to other copyrightable subject matter productions. The real
value of a sketch is in creating the actual garment, which is itself
unprotected. Because the actual work is unprotected, a designer will have no
recourse to claim infringement by another's article, even if it was based on
the sketch alone.
[63] The most palpable explanation for the
dichotomy is the degree to which the general public is involved. By allowing
copyright in fashion, the courts and the legislature feared the creation of
continual short term monopolies for desirable goods. The nature of
architecture (and the length of construction) apparently render the possibility
of design monopolies moot.
[64] The 1976 Copyright Act brought the United
States into compliance with some of the minimum protections offered under
international copyright law, most notably an extension of the duration of
copyright to "life plus 50 years". See CRAIG JOYCE, WILLIAM PATRY,
MARSHALL LEAFFER & PETER JASZI, 3 COPYRIGHT LAW 988 [hereinafter JOYCE].
The 1976 Act, however, fell short of complete compatibility, thus requiring
numerous amendments to the 1976 Act. See id.; S. Rep. No. 100-352,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988).
[65] See Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
[hereinafter BCIA].
[66] The Treaty text was first established in
Berne Switzerland in 1886, and has been revised six times. The United States
adheres to the most recent language of the treaty as contained in the 1971
version adopted in Paris. See JOYCE, supra note 64 at 984-85.
[67] See id. at 988.
[68] See id.
[69] See id. at 991 (citing the delayed
protection available to copyrights of architectural works, which were initially
barred under the useful articles doctrine of U.S. law, but eventually protected
under an interpretation of the "moral rights" theory).
[70] See id.
[71] See e.g., SociÈtÈ
Yves Saint Laurent Couture v. SociÈtÈ Louis Dreyfus Retail Mgmt.,
[1994] ECC 512, 18 May 1994, (Paris) (Ralph Lauren was found to have exactly
copied a YSL dress). (NB: Mr. Lauren is "known" to be heavily "inspired" by the
works of his fellow designers. This was not the first time he was sued for
infringment in Europe).
[72] In the United Kingdom, a garment design
will be protected as long as it can be related back to a copyright drawing.
See Schmidt, supra note 7 at fn.94 (citing 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 163 (1981)). Under French law, garment designs are protected as applied
art or non-functional designs and patterns. Designs may be protected upon a
showing of public popularity, even though there is no evidence of originality.
See id. (citing DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCE GÈNËRALE, at
PROPIÈTË LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE and DESSINS ET MODELES
(1952)).
[73] A copier may mark his clothing as being
"inspired" or "copied" from a certain designer without fear of trademark
infringement or false advertising.
[74] U.S. interests complain about the loss of
entertainment and computer software profits in Asian nations, due to rampant
pirating of copyrighted materials. The World Intellectual Property
Organization is debating three new treaties which would harmonize the copyright
standards.
[75] It is not uncommon for design pirates to
sneak into a designer's fashion show in Paris (or raid the studio's trash for
sketches) and have "knock-offs" available in New York the next day.
[76] This paper concedes all arguments
concerning the improved utility of clothing absent hoop skirts, bustles, or
corsets.
[77] See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograthing
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Keiselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632
F.2d 989 (2nd Cir. 1980).
[78] See Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239.
[79] See Keiselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d
989.
[80] See Wm. Filene's Sons Co. v.
Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., 14 F. Supp. 353, 354 (D. Mass. 1936),
aff'd, 90 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1937).
[81] The Supreme Court stated that "[c]reative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded....The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an `author's' creative labor." See
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
[82] The conflict over software has fueled the
debate on whether copyright has been over-extended.
[83] 17 U.S.C. ß 101.
[84] See e.g., Ted Arnold, Ltd. v.
Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (pencil sharpener in the
shape of an antique telephone recognized as having consumer appeal because it
was a decorative conversation piece).
[85] 17 U.S.C. ß 101.
[86] 17 U.S.C. ß 101 (definition of
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
[87] See Raymond M. Polakovic,
Should the Bauhaus be in the Copyright Doghouse? Rethinking Conceptual
Separability, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 872-73 (Summer 1993).
[88] See id. at 873. Copyright
protection in a useful article may preclude others from duplicating the
underlying function without consequently infringing the artisan's copyright.
Id.
[89] 17 U.S.C. ß 101 (definition of
useful article).
[90] See generally Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (court granted
copyright protection in a belt buckle, after finding that consumers were mainly
using the buckle as jewellery and not as a belt buckle).
[91] See Polakovic, supra note
87 at 873.
[92] See id. Polakovic cites statutes,
administrative regulations, congressional advisory notes, case law and academic
theories as creating confusion regarding the appropriate course of action to be
taken by a particular court. See id.; 37 C.F.R. ß 202.10(a)
(1992) (intention of the author not an issue); Robert C. Denicola, Applied
Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright Protection in
Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983) (asserting that the intention
of the artist to create art as opposed to industrial design is of paramount
importance); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976), reprinted
in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668 (indicating that either physical or conceptual
separability must be present before copyright protection can extend to useful
articles).
[93] See generally Brandir Int'l v.
Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (copyright denied because
court could not separate the aesthetic attributes from the utility of a bicycle
rack design); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (copyright
denied for light fixture which mimicked modern abstract art even though the
functional and aesthetic elements could have been physically separated).
[94] See Polakovic, supra note
87 at 874.
[95] See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954) (copyright protection of Balinese statuette used as a lampbase was
upheld despite its incorporation into the useful article).
[96] The House Reports pertaining to the
revisions set forth in the 1976 Act maintain the notion of conceptual
separability, although the actual statute does not explicitly condone the
practice. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 8 at 55,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668. See also Carol Barnhart
Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); National Theme Prod.,
Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
[97] See Polakovic, supra note
87 at 875 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903)).
[98] See Barnhart, 773 F.2d 411.
[99] See Denicola, supra note 92
at 709.
[100] See id.
[101] See Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). "The limited grant [of
copyright protection] is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors ... by
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired".
[102] See Polakovic, supra
note 87 at 876-77. Polakovic is mainly concerned with industrial designers
versus sculptors, and that under the Denicola model, legal savvy industrial
designers would be able to document their "creative process" to the detriment
of pure artistic sculptors who don't bother to document their process. See
id. Polakovic further notes that since a design patent is upheld in only
30% of the infringement suits, industrial designers have a greater incentive to
obtain copyright protection. See id. (citing Ralph S. Brown, Design
Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1353 (1987). See
generally Brandir, 834 F.2d 1142.
[103] See Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239.
In Bleistein, the court warned against judges deciding the merits of
artistic works, rather artistic merit should be presumed based on the finding
of public giving merit. Because useful articles will by their utilitarian
nature have a market, this reasoning becomes ineffectual.
[104] See id. Polakovic also
questions whether a finding resulting in the denial of copyright protection for
an industrial designer in favor of another designer, would violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at fn. 21
and accompanying text.
[105] See Barnhart, 773 F.2d 411,
(Newman, J., dissenting).
[106] See id. at 422.
[107] See Polakovic, supra
note 87 at 879 (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 43-45 (6th
ed. 1986)).
[108] See Polakovic, supra
note 87 at 879.
[109] The majority in Barnhart held
that Newman's approach was a "non-test". See Barnhart, 773 F.2d 411.
[110] See Polakovic, supra
note 87 at 880.
[111] See id.
[112] See id.
[113] See id.
[114] See Whimsicality Inc. v.
Rubie's Costumes Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
[115] See id.
[116] See National Theme Products,
Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Cal. 1988)
[117] See id. at 1354. Court stated:
"Costumes' artistic features simply do not advance their utilitarian purpose as
clothing or accessories....Given the minimal functional considerations which
went into the design of the costumes, the court holds they should be afforded
protection as applied art under the copyright law." Id.
[118] See Polakovic, supra
note 87 at 890.
[119] See id. at 892.
[120] See id. This method would
allow the court to escape judgments on the artistic merit and the creative
process. See id.
[121] See id. at 895.
[122] See Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
[123] Designers will allow "inspiration"
but not a decrease in market share or their reputation as creative geniuses.
[124] The duration would begin at the first
public exhibition of the work. Given the nature of the industry, designers
have no rational basis for keeping their work "unpublished" or otherwise
circumventing the start date. The right to create derivative works would
necessarily be limited to this one year period, unless the derivative work
could qualify for separate copyright protection.
[125] The French term of copyright is
limited to one season (year). See Schmidt, supra note 7 at 876
(citing Gros et Cie. v. dame Gally, Gazette du Palais (May 19, 1953). In the
Yves Saint Laurent infringement action, although the design was first
presented in 1970, the court found that Ralph Lauren has copied the work after
it was represented in a 1992 YSL fall show. See Yves Saint Laurent,
[1994] EEC 512.
[126] Compulsory license and royalty systems
already exist for phonorecords, cable television, juke boxes and noncommercial
broadcasting. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 116 and 118.
[127] Conversely, young and unknown
designers could benefit by having major manufacturers or designers license
their works. Additionally, a license system could be set up to include both
the royalty collection and a fund for enforcement, matching the system of ASCPA
or BMI.
[128] A license fee could be based on either
a per copy amount or a percentage of retail sales. Due to the nature of retail
fashion sales, it seems reasonable to take a per copy count. This way
inventory figures from retail stores could be utilized to determine the
appropriate fee due. Schmidt recommends taking a royalty of 1% of the retail
price per copy. See Schmidt, supra note 7 at fn.128. This would
secure perhaps 200 million dollars for designers, based on an estimated apparel
spending of 200 billion, while not creating any great additional burdens for
the consumers.
[129] Arguably, subtle changes in the design
may qualify for separate copyright protection, however, manufacturers would
likely pay the royalty rate then become embroiled in an infringement action.
Moreover, it is the entire garment which will be viewed not the component
parts, since there will obviously be no copyright protection for the normal
design elements already within the public domain, such as seams, hems, or
button closures.
[130] See Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
[131] See Universal City Studios v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'd, 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
[132] The policy follows the argument that
truly creative people will always create, while others need economic incentives
to add to the cultural store.
[133] In Europe many designers have discount
stores to sell off-season wears. In the U.S. discount retailers either sell
the off-season and damaged wears at separate stores, such as Filene's Basement,
or sell the product in bulk to other retailers like Marshalls. The difference
is the ability of the designer to control this secondary market.
[134]There is always a market for consumers
who will purchase designers goods because of the designer. But since designers
could be consistently underpriced by manufacturers who had no development
costs, designers were forced to raise the price and limit volume of their
creations in order to maintain financial stability.
[135] Designers have also turned their
corporations into public companies. While most of the IPO's offer quick cash,
their value as an investment is low.
[136] Many designers have several lines or
labels. Usually the actual designer creates work for the haute couture and
ready-to-wear lines while merely overseeing the lesser labels. For instance,
New York designer Donna Karan maintains a signature collection as well as the
lesser line known as DKNY. This trend also is found in Europe, Giorgio Armani
has six separate labels.
[137] The lesser labels show how designers
can be creative business people. The designers are also benefited by the
public's desire to have designer clothing, which the lesser labels can
provide.
[138] Fashion designers have always been
known for their quality of design, materials and construction. In the race to
compete with the design pirates, the apparel industry has continually
eliminated these elements. One of the most unfortunate precipitates of this
battle has been the rise in exploitative child labor in overseas garment
factories, a practice in relation to which neither the pirates nor the
designers can claim innocence.
|