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Derivatives In order for a work to qualify as a derivative work it must be independently copyrightable. Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1320-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989).Under copyright law, the copyrght holder has rights to all derivatives of the registered copyright. But what is a derivative? It's easy to allege something is a derivative when it isn't. However, there are federal and professional opinions that define a derivative. For a work to be considered a derivative work the work must first contain originality and second, be made lawfully as described under 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). The term "lawfully" refers to permission granted by the true copyright owner. Therefore, one who is found to have derived a work from a copyrighted work would be liable for infringement if the derivation was made without the owner's permission. The standard which courts have used in determining the amount of originality needed for a work to be considered a derivative work has been that the derivative work must make a variation on an underlying work that is considered more than "merely trivial." If the level of originality is considered more than "merely trivial" and the person seeking a copyright has lawfully received permission to create the derivative work, the author of the adaptation will be entitled to his or her own derivative copyright which will be separate from the copyright contained in the underlining work. The level of originality required does vary among the United States Courts of Appeals, leading to uncertainty as to how the law will apply to the new medium of the Web. Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act gives a copyright owner the exclusive right to produce derivative works. The Second Circuit's Durham test, which holds that to support a copyright, the original aspects of a derivative work: (1) must be more than trivial; and (2) must reflect the degree to which the derivative work relies on preexisting material and must not in any way affect the scope of any copyright protection in that preexisting material. A derivative must be copyrightable. Corporate lawyers will readily claim that something is a derivative, often citing the flawed Ninth Circuit Mirage case, and willfully ignoring the many other circuits that disagreed. Remember, the allegations are designed to intimidate you into submission, sort of a legal "Shock And Awe" tactic, so they will not have to engage in a court battle. You will find that the other side will readily lie to you in order to get you to agree to their terms. Here are some short outlimes of court cases about Deriivatives:
From Emphasizing the Copy in Copyright: The fundamental problem that the court in Mirage failed to address is that a derivative work, by definition, contains some new copyrightable expression, and that therefore, to find there has been an infringement of the derivative work right under Section 106, one must find such new expression to be present. This important doctrinal point was, however, addressed in Lee v. Deck the Walls Inc., 925 F.Supp. 576 (N.D.Ill. 1996). Plaintiff Annie Lee, an artist, sued defendants for gluing her notecards to ceramic tiles and covering the images on the tiles with clear epoxy resin. The court in Lee rejected the holding of Mirage Editions and Munoz, observing that to be an infringing derivative work an object must be original enough that, if lawful, it would qualify for protection as a derivative work. The Lee court cited Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2nd Cir. 1995), for the rule that to be a derivative work a thing must be "independently copyrightable." The court found no "creative spark" in the "mundane act of placing notecards onto a ceramic tile." The court also cited in support of its finding the case of Paramount Pictures v. Video Broadcasting System, 724 F.Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989), in which the addition of commercials at the beginning of videocassette movies was not found to create infringing derivative works. In Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118 (1994), the court held that to qualify as a derivative work, there must be such things as unusual vocal treatment, additional lyrics of consequence, unusual altered harmonics, novel sequential uses of themes, or something of substance added which makes the piece to some extent a new work Precious Moments sued La Infantil because La Infantil was converting licensed Precious Moments fabric into bedding and selling it in their stores. Precious Moments also replied on Mirage. In Precious Moments the court stated: |
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Mirage and its progeny have been criticized by others as well. See 1 Nimmer on Copyrights, § 3.03 (quoted in Lee,
925 F.Supp. at 579 n. 2); 2 Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 5.3 at 5:81 (2d ed.1996) (described as "condemning Mirage as an unwarranted extension
*69 of the Copyright Act" in Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L.Rev. 989, 1084 n.
144 (April 1997)); Black and Page, Add-On Infringements, at 629 (describing Mirage as "often criticized"); David Goldberg and Robert J.
Bernstein, "What is a Derivative Work? ... Continued," 9/20/96 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col.1) ("[T]he Ninth Circuit approach applied in Greenwich Workshop
is unsupported by the statutory text."). Id., 971 F.Supp. 66, 69 |
| The court also stated: |
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This Court agrees with the Lee court that Mirage and the subsequent cases read the originality requirement out of the definition of
"derivative work" and open the door for the most trivial of modifications to generate an infringing derivative work. Applying the proper standard to the
case at bar, the Court finds that the necessary element of originality is absent from the items manufactured for La Infantil from the Precious Moments fabric.
They therefore do not constitute "derivative works" infringing on Precious Moments' copyright. Precious Moments thus does not carry its burden of showing
a likelihood of success on the merits on its copyright claim, and the Court need not consider the remaining requirements for a preliminary injunction. Id., 971 F.Supp. 66, 69 |
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From paragraph 31, the Ninth Curciut Court of Appeals in
PERFECT 10, INC., vs AMAZON.COM, INC et al, 487 F.3d 701:
See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.1992). We held that a copyright holder's right to create derivative works is not infringed unless the alleged derivative work "incorporate[s] a protected work in some concrete or permanent `form.'" Id. In other words, in some contexts, the claimant must be able to claim infringement of its reproduction right in order to claim infringement of its right to prepare derivative works. |
| See also American Bar Association report Committee #304 Report from 1996-1997. |


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